

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 306158
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY PM:ENEWSOM:DLJ
APPROVED BY PM:LHGELB
EUR - MR. GOODBY
S/S-O:MRLINO

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O 231656Z DEC 77 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 306158

NODIS
USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE FRG ON SALT

1. SUMMARY: TALKS IN WASHINGTON WITH FRG POLITICAL
DIRECTOR BLECH DECEMBER 20-21 WENT VERY WELL. THE GERMANS
APPEARED RELAXED, AND THE MOOD OF BOTH SIDES WAS POSITIVE.
WE REASSURED THE GERMANS THAT WE PUT THE ALLIANCE FIRST,
AND BLECH RESPONDED THAT THE GERMANS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRE-
CIATED THIS. WE ARE CLOSER TOGETHER ON SALT QUESTIONS THAN
WE HAD THOUGHT SOME WEEKS AGO, ALTHOUGH THE NON-CIRCUMVEN-
TION PROVISION IN SALT II REMAINS A DIFFICULT POINT WITH

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THE GERMANS. ON MOST ISSUES, THE GERMANS HAD NO HARD AND
FAST POSITIONS OR SUGGESTIONS AND APPEARED TO BE THINKING
OUT LOUD WITH US. END SUMMARY.

2. MUCH OF WHAT THE GERMANS SAID WAS VAGUE AND NUANCED,
BUT THEY DID ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON TWO KEY THEMES WE HAVE
HEARD RECENTLY:

-- SALT/MBFR LINK: THE GERMANS REPEATED THE THEME OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S LONDON SPEECH ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONCEPT FOR LINKING THE "SALT PROCESS" AND MBFR. THEY CAME CLOSE TO SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH SALT II WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE FRG COULD NOT ENVISAGE A SALT

III AGREEMENT WITHOUT MOVEMENT IN MBFR -- WITHOUT, HOWEVER, MAKING CLEAR HOW TO GET MBFR MOVING.

-- SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF SALT III: BLECH SAID THE MOST LOGICAL THING MIGHT BE FOR SALT III TO CONTINUE AS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION INVOLVING ONLY U.S. AND SOVIET SYSTEMS. U.S. FBS, INCLUDING U.S. THEATER CRUISE MISSILES, WOULD BE IN THE NEGOTIATION ONLY IF SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS -- THE SS-20 -- WERE ALSO INCLUDED. AND IF THE SOVIETS WOULD REFUSE TO INCLUDE THEIR THEATER SYSTEMS, BLECH SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT INCLUDE ITS FBS (MEANING CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL). THE FRG DOES NOT APPEAR TO EXPECT THAT EUROPEAN SYSTEMS (AND EUROPEAN CRUISE MISSILES) WOULD BE IN SALT III.

3. NON-CIRCUMVENTION: THE GERMANS FEEL THE MOST URGENCY AND CONCERN ABOUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE. BLECH RAISED THE ISSUE OF SPECIFICITY VERSUS GENERALITY IN NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE, AND SAID THAT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS A HIGHLY SPECIFIC NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO THE FRG. WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS A PROVISION ENUMERATING UNAMBIGUOUSLY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SUCH AS ICBMS. THIS WAY, IT WOULD BE CLEAR THAT SYSTEMS NOT LISTED (WHICH WOULD MEAN THEATER CRUISE MISSILES) COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO OUR ALLIES. BLECH ADMITTED THAT THIS APPROACH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UK AND FRANCE, WHO HAD STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. OUR RESPONSE WAS THAT A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE WAS PURELY A BARGAINING TACTIC TO DRIVE THE SOVIETS OFF A SPECIFIC NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE AND PRESERVE MAXIMUM FREEDOM FOR OURSELVES. WE SAID THE NEGOTIATING RECORD WOULD SUPPORT OUR POSITION THAT FBS AND THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN GENERAL WERE EXCLUDED FROM SALT II AND NOT OPEN TO CHALLENGE UNDER A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE ISSUE REALLY CAME DOWN TO WHAT WAS THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE PRESERVING NATO'S FREEDOM TO DO WHAT IS IN ITS SECURITY INTEREST.

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4. CRUISE MISSILES AND THE PROTOCOL: THE GERMANS ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD DO ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES AFTER THE PROTOCOL EXPIRES. THEY WERE

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5. FUTURE CONSULTATIONS: THE GERMANS AGREE WITH US THAT
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II ISSUES AND THE SHAPE OF SALT III. VANCE

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S E C R E T STATE 306158

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 306158 ACTION BONN
INFO USNATO LONDON PARIS GENEVA VIENNA 23 DEC 77

QUOTE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS, PLANNING MEETINGS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 23-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Drafter: ENEWSOM:DLJ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
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Review Media Identifier:
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Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 137256
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE FRG ON SALT
TAGS: PARM, GE, US
To: BONN USNATO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3cb7cafd-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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